Abstract-Based on two strands of theoretical research, this paper provides new evidence on how fares are jointly affected by in-flight seat availability and purchasing date. As capacity-based theories predict, it emerges that fares monotonically and substantially increase with flight occupancy. After controlling for capacity utilization, our analysis also supports time-based theories, indicating a U-shaped temporal profile over a two-month booking period, as well as a sharp increase in fares in the two weeks prior to departure.
Ryanair. The relatively simple pricing behavior of an LCA helps us to identify the combined impact on fares of both inflight seat availability and the time separating the purchase from the departure date. This in turn allows us to provide a test for the predictions of two theoretical strands of research on airline pricing: the capacity-based and the time-based theories. Capacity-based theories focus on the relationship between the evolution of fares and a flight's occupancy rate; Dana (1999a) postulates that such a relationship is defined by the airlines at the beginning of the planning horizon, while Deneckere and Peck (2012) extend the static analysis to allow for possible dynamic updating of the relationship. In both the static and the dynamic case, fares are predicted to be a nonstrictly increasing function of the remaining capacity within each planning period.
In this paper, we provide a direct test of the relevance of capacity-based theories. A main practical difficulty in carrying out this test is the availability of data on capacity utilization at the time a fare is offered on an airline reservation system. Another complication, usually associated with fares by full-service airlines, may arise because different booking classes, each with a different set of restrictions and fares, may be simultaneously available to travelers at a given point in time, thus making it necessary to account for ticket characteristics (Stavins, 2001) . A notable innovation in this study is the possibility to combine fares with the number of seats available at the time when the fare was retrieved from the airline's website. Moreover, using data from Ryanair rules out any difference in seat characteristics, because the airline imposes the same set of restrictions on all its fares. Furthermore, by using flight fixed-effect panel data techniques, where the time dimension is obtained by tracking a flight's fares and seat availability over a seventy-day period, we also control for possible unobserved heterogeneity across flights. Our estimates indicate that on average, an extra seat sold induces an increase of about 3.1% in offered fares. This effect increases in the sample of flights that operate in less competitive routes; are scheduled in summer or depart in the evening (i.e., periods of higher demand); and are short haul and less volatile.
These results show the relevant role of capacity-based theories in explaining airline price dispersion. The previous evidence on this issue is rather mixed. On the one hand, Puller, Sengupta, and Wiggins (2009) find only modest support for the capacity-based theories and illustrate that much of the fare variation may be associated with seconddegree price discrimination (i.e., ticket characteristics). On the other, Escobari and Gan (2007) find that price quotes are on average higher in fully occupied flights, as predicted by capacity-based theories. Both studies, however, rely on data generated by the more complex process used by legacy carriers, whose properties are only partly aligned with the assumptions adopted by any of the models in the theoretical literature.
Time-based theories state that airlines may use intertemporal price discrimination to exploit customer heterogeneity in terms of willingness to pay and uncertainty about departure time (Gale & Holmes, 1992 Dana, 1999b; Möller & Watanabe, 2010) . On the one hand, the application of advance-purchase discounts (APD), that is, fare reductions in the periods far from the departure date, plays in favor of an increasing temporal fare profile. On the other, clearance sale practices (Möller & Watanabe, 2010) , that is, fare reductions in the period immediately preceding departure, and the declining option value of waiting for customers with a higher willingness to pay (Gallego & van Ryzin, 1994) suggest that the opposite effect cannot be excluded.
This study sheds light on Ryanair's time-based pricing policy. If a temporal profile is coded into the carrier's reservation system or is the result of the analyst's intervention, it can be identified by tracking the evolution of each flight's fares over time (Mantin & Koo, 2009) . A novel feature of our work is that we do so after controlling for capacity utilization. Thus, we are able to separate fare variations due to purely capacitybased motivation from those induced by the willingness to discriminate between customers booking at different times before departure. The evidence reveals that on average, fares increase monotonically over three weeks before departure. However, a more complex price dynamics is also found over the entire booking period we take into consideration: in the two months preceding departure, the temporal profile of fares often appears to be U-shaped. A similar finding is reported in Bilotkach, Gorodnichenko, and Talavera (2010) , although they have no control for capacity utilization.
In sum, this paper offers the first combined study of two testable implications derived from the theoretical economics literature on airline pricing. Both implications relate to the pricing profile of carriers, suggesting that fares should increase as a flight fills up and should grow over time, but may have a more complex U-shaped temporal pattern. A notable innovation of this study is that it addresses both of these features simultaneously. Given the parallel movement that both effects induce on fares, studying one without the other is likely to bias the analysis. Furthermore, the joint investigation of both properties sheds lights on the relative importance of two classes of theoretical airline pricing models, each focusing on the capacity and the time dimension (Alderighi, 2010; Puller et al., 2009) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, while section III illustrates Ryanair's business model and its importance in the European airline market. In section IV, we explain how we retrieved the information on the flight's occupancy at the time when the fares were posted. Section V provides descriptive statistics on the fare profile. The econometric model is presented in section VI, which is followed by comments on the main findings in section VII. Section VIII concludes.
II. Literature Review
This section reviews the main theoretical and empirical works on YM, which are related to both capacity-based and the time-based theories. 2 Dana (1999a) provides a theoretical model that addresses the link between fares and seat availability when capacity is fixed by assuming that fares are set before demand is known. The basic idea is that the optimal fare is given by a constant mark-up over the capacity cost. Because the shadow cost of a unit of capacity increases as the probability of selling a ticket decreases, the distribution of fares increases with capacity utilization. In other words, price dispersion arises not because an airline is trying to segment the market, but because demand is uncertain, and the probability of selling an extra seat decreases with in-flight seat utilization. In equilibrium, the airline defines a fare distribution where the cheapest fares are assigned to seats with the highest probability of sale and the highest fares are associated with seats that are seldom occupied. The analysis, however, assumes a commitment to the equilibrium price schedule: the airline cannot revise its ex ante pricing decision as it learns new information about actual observed demand. As Deneckere and Peck (2012) indicate, such a commitment where prices cannot be adjusted over time is inefficient. More important, Deneckere and Peck (2012) develop a model where, on the supply side, current prices depend on the evolution of the aggregate quantity sold in previous periods; on the demand side, intertemporal substitution is allowed so that on the basis of their expectation of future prices and their private information about the state of demand, consumers may decide whether to purchase today or to delay buying in the hope of getting a better deal in later periods. In equilibrium, within each period, transaction prices increase with the amount of sales made over the period, with the possibility at the beginning of each period of a markdown whose size is inversely related with the observed demand of the previous period. This is consistent with the empirical observation that prices within a route do not generally monotonically increase over time; sometimes they fall (Piga & Bachis, 2007) . Furthermore, because the equilibrium prices in Deneckere and Peck (2012) are martingales, on average a flat temporal path over the booking period should be observed. However, such a prediction may not hold in a model incorporating the possibility of using intertemporal pricing strategies to screen heterogeneous travelers, as the time-based theories suggest.
In Dana (1999b) , firms cannot distinguish between peak and nonpeak flights, and travelers differ in their disutility to fly at their least preferred time; in equilibrium, firms commit to a distribution of monotonically increasing fares over time for each flight. Gale and Holmes (1992) show that a 902 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS monopolist, and a social planner, can use APD to spread uncertain peak demand more evenly between two flights. Gale and Holmes (1993) show that in a monopoly with capacity constraints and perfectly predictable demand, APD arises from a mechanism design setting where consumers self-select so that demand is diverted from peak periods to off-peak periods. Möller and Watanabe (2010) study the conditions under which, over two consecutive periods, prices may either decline or increase. They demonstrate that the former (the latter) is more appropriate when a consumer's demand uncertainty is absent (present) and the risk of being rationed is high (low).
Due to the difficulty of obtaining data on the occupancy rate at the time when a fare is offered either online or on a computer reservation system, only a limited number of empirical studies have tried to shed light on the accuracy and relevance of the theoretical predictions resulting from both capacityand time-based theories. Puller et al. (2009) test a number of implications derived from the theoretical work of Dana (1999a) and Gale and Holmes (1992, 1993) . Using a proxy for a flight's load factor, they divide their sample into quartiles of expected demand (i.e., from expected full to expected empty). According to Dana (1999a) , within each category, the carriers are supposed to apply the same rule linking fares and occupancy rate. That is, after controlling for the expected demand, one should observe a greater proportion of higher fares (and therefore a higher mean fare and a greater measure of fare dispersion) as the realized load factor grows. The descriptive evidence in Puller et al. (2009) shows no support for these predictions.
To test the predictions from Gale and Holmes's work, Puller et al. (2009) evaluate whether discount tickets account for a smaller share of tickets in high-peak flights (defined as those expected to fly full and indeed realized to be full) and a larger share on off-peak ones (those expected to be empty and turned out to fly empty). After controlling for the number of days in advance of the flight a ticket was purchased, the evidence shows no significant difference among these shares across types of flights and carriers. Finally, Puller et al. (2009) illustrate how ticket restrictions explain a substantial amount of variation in fares, and conclude that standard price discrimination strategies appear to play a more crucial role in driving fare dispersion than those based on capacity management. Such a result may be due to the highly heterogeneous way with which airlines manage their inventory using ex ante mechanisms, as discussed in Bilotkach et al. (2010) .
Interestingly, using panel data techniques, Escobari and Gan (2007) find evidence in support of capacity-based theories. In their work, which addresses a similar topic to ours, they derive an effective cost of capacity (ECC) by dividing an estimate of the fixed unit capacity cost by a calibrated measure of the probability a seat is sold; thus, the ECC increases as a seat's probability to sell decreases. Escobari and Gan (2007) test and find support for the hypothesis that a higher ECC should lead to higher prices and this effect should be larger in competitive markets.
Using the same data, Escobari (2012) confirms that, holding inventories constant, fares decrease until about fourteen days from departure and subsequently increase. The declining profile is consistent with the theoretical model in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) , where the option value of waiting for the arrival of a customer with a high willingness to pay falls as the departure date approaches. However, the increasing time profile in the late booking period, also found in McAfee and te Velde (2007) , suggests that other factors are at play, such as a carrier's need to establish a reputation for consistently not offering last-minute deals, which could lead customers to delay their purchases. Furthermore, Escobari (2012) focuses on whether carriers adjust dynamically to unexpected shocks in demand and finds strong evidence in favor of prices responding to new information about the pattern of sales: as the uncertainty on aggregate demand dispels, the airline intervenes to adjust its fares. This finding is thus complementary to our analysis, which focuses on the role played by the predetermined adjustments implied by the capacity-based theories.
III. Ryanair's Business Model
Drawing on the business model established by Southwest Airlines in the United States, Ryanair pioneered the low-cost strategy in Europe. The business model that Ryanair adopts has several notable features: (a) a simple pricing structure with one cabin class (with optional paid-for in-flight food and drink) and no discrimination between one-way and roundtrip ticket fares; (b) direct selling through Internet bookings with electronic tickets and no seat reservations; 3 (c) simplified point-to-point routes often involving cheaper, less congested airports; (d) intensive aircraft use (typically with 25-minute turnaround times); (e) employees working in multiple roles (e.g., flight attendants who also clean the aircraft and act as gate agents); and (f) a standardized fleet made up of only Boeing 737-800 aircrafts, with a capacity of 189 seats.
Founded in 1985 and based in Dublin, Ryanair expanded its route network rapidly following the liberalization of intra-EU air services, increasing its passenger numbers from 5.6 million in 2000 to 33.6 million in 2005, reaching over 71.2 million by 2010. For comparison, in the same year the number of passengers flying with Lufthansa (44.4 million), easyJet (37.6 million), Air France and Emirates (both 30.8 million), and British Airways (26.3 million) was considerably lower. Ryanair has also been a consistently profitable business in a sector in which many airlines have struggled to make profits from one year to another, its operating revenues (profit) in 2000, which amounted to 370 (72.5) million euros, escalated to the value of 3,629 (374.6) million euros in the financial year ending on March 31, 2011. 4 The size and importance of this carrier, and its ability to attract customers, make it a key player in the European airline industry.
A. Insights into Ryanair's YM Practices
Unlike most full-service carriers, Ryanair employs a relatively simple pricing structure with no price discrimination based on multiple service and cabin classes and on specific restrictions like minimum stay requirements and Saturday night stay-overs. Furthermore, all its tickets carry the same penalties for a name, date, or route variation and permit the same free in-flight hand baggage allowance (maximum 10 kilograms) with a fixed fee for each checked bag (maximum 15 kilograms per item). The applicability of our findings to legacy carriers might be limited by these differences; albeit none of these impinge on the YM aspects on which we focus on in this paper, since they are unaffected by capacity utilization or by temporal aspects. 5 Thus, the use of Ryanair data offers some advantages for the empirical analysis, since its ticket characteristics (identical restrictions) are close to the modeling assumption of many theoretical works.
Interesting insights into how Ryanair designs its YM system are given by the European Commission (2007), which provides details of the investigation that led to the decision to block the takeover by Ryanair of Aer Lingus. Both companies may choose from a set of standard templates, each describing "the number of places that should be available in a given price category ("booking class")" (p. 109, item 439); each adopted template is the one that is expected to best match a specific flight's characteristics. The template thus appears to correspond to the practical implementation of the notion of an equilibrium distribution of fares across the full set of an aircraft's seats given in Dana (1999a) .
The template is also instrumental in the carrier's adoption of a multifaceted pricing policy that, in addition to a pure capacity-based strategy, allows for time effects, as well as responses to unexpected shocks. Indeed, as suggested by the European Commission (2007), the time dimension of the carrier's YM practice is obtained by changing the number of seats assigned to each booking class: a decrease or an increase of fares is brought about "by making more seats available in the cheaper [or more expensive] price categories" (p. 109, item 440). Note, however, that similar alterations of the standard template may be applied when the carrier needs to respond to an unexpected shock. The important difference lies in the fact that, on the one hand, time effects are designed to include predefined changes in the template that take place in a routine fashion; that is, they occur systematically at specific times. On the other hand, responses to an unexpected shock arise only after the template is set; the ensuing modification to the template is thus discretionary in nature and is spurred by either external (e.g., new qualitative information on future demand, changes in the rivals' behavior) or internal (e.g., a promotional policy of the marketing department) factors that are known by the carrier but are unobserved by the econometrician. 6 To sum up, fares are the results of three drivers-capacity, time, and shocks-where the former two give rise to an "augmented template" that captures the airline's routine YM operations, while the latter come about through a discretionary intervention of a YM analyst. One of the main contributions of this paper is to identify the routine activity, which simultaneously considers how fares are related to seat occupancy and how they are designed to change as the time to departure nears. 7 By doing so, we shed light on the role played by the capacity-and time-based theories in explaining the airline's fare-setting process, after purging for the discretionary intervention.
IV. Data Collection
Our analysis is based on primary data on fares collected using an "electronic spider" linked to the Ryanair website. 8 The database includes daily flight information from January 2004 up to, and including, June 2005. In order to account for the heterogeneity of fares offered by airlines at different times prior to departure, every day we instructed the spider to collect the one-way fares for departures due 1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 , and 70 days from the date of the query. Henceforth, we refer to these as Booking Days. 9 Thus, for every daily flight, we obtained up to thirteen prices that differ by the time interval from the day of departure and allow the identification of the evolution of fares over time.
Data collection was carried out every day at the same time and included the price of one seat, which in the remainder of the paper we denote as Fare1; the number of seats available at each booking day, denoted as Seats; and the corresponding unit price for a query involving that number of seats, referred to as Top Fare (see sections IVA and IVB for a discussion of both fares and their role within a template). We also collected the time and date of the query, the departure date, the scheduled departure and arrival times, the origin and destination airports, and the flight identification code, all of which we used as controls in the econometric analysis.
6 From a YM analyst's operational perspective, the distinction between routine and discretionary interventions implies that the former are carried out as part of a set of standard codified tasks that are regularly scheduled (e.g., the modification of the original template to implement a specified temporal price profile). As emerged from our discussion with industry practitioners, routine tasks may be automated subject to the analyst's approval. Conversely, discretionary changes trigger an update of a flight's prior forecast and therefore may lead to a revision of the template. 7 In section VB, we show how changes over time appear to be coded into the airline's computerized reservation system. 8 All fares are net of add-ons and other fees (i.e., charges for the use of some of the methods of payment, such as credit cards).
9 For instance, assume the queries were carried out on March 1, 2004. The spider would retrieve the fares for flights whose departures were due on March 2, 2004; March 5, 2004; March 8, 2004; March 11, 2004 ; and so on. The procedure was repeated every day over the data collection period. The table includes a selection of routes with more than 1,000 observations in our estimation sample of flights with fewer than fifty seats available.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
In addition to U.K. domestic fares, we surveyed routes to the following countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. For consistency, the procedure considered only flights departing from an airport within the United Kingdom and arriving at either a domestic or an international airport. We have data for 82 of the 154 routes that Ryanair operated to these countries over the sample period; in some cases, we consider more than one flight code per route when the airline operated more than one daily flight. All fares, which do not include tax and handling fees, are for a one-way flight and are quoted in sterling. 10 Some descriptive statistics are reported in tables 1 and 2, and discussed in more detail in section IVB.
A. Retrieving Data on Seats and Top Fare
The collection strategy exploited a feature of Ryanair's website: during the sample period, Ryanair allowed purchases of up to fifty seats using a single query. This made it possible to learn if, at the time of the query, fewer than fifty seats were available on a flight with a specific identification code. The spider worked using the following algorithm:
• Issue a query for S = 50 seats for a specific flight identified by a unique flight code on a route. The flight was due to depart D days from the date of the query, where 10 Focusing only on the outward leg from the United Kingdom emerges as a valid data collection strategy, since it is widely acknowledged that European LCAs price each leg independently (Bachis & Piga, 2011) . Moreover, excluding taxes and fees does not affect the results for the following reasons. First, Ryanair started charging a fixed fee for check-in and luggage only in 2006, after our sample period. Second, the fixed per passenger tax that contributes to the full cost of the ticket would not impinge on the evaluation of how a flight's fare changes relative to the flight's occupancy rate or over time.
D assumes the values of the Booking Day previously introduced.
• If the airline's site returned a valid fare for that flight code, we interpreted this finding as follows: D days prior to departure, there were at least fifty seats available on the flight. We could not, however, retrieve any more precise information regarding the actual observed number of available seats, which is thus censored at the level of fifty. The spider would then save the value of Seats = 50, and the corresponding value of Top Fare, as well as the value of D and all the other flight's details.
• If the site failed to return a valid fare for that flight, the program inferred that there were fewer than fifty seats available and then started a search to obtain the highest number of seats in a query that returned a valid fare. This corresponds to the number of seats available D days before a flight's departure, a value saved in Seats. In this case, Top Fare corresponds to the unit price at which the airline was willing to sell all the S remaining seats in a single transaction.
By repeating this procedure every day, we could track the seats and the associated fare for each value of Booking Day.
B. Interpretation of Retrieved Fares
When Seats < 50, Top Fare corresponds to the fare of a transaction whose completion would fill the flight to capacity. 11 For this reason, Top Fare presents two important characteristics. First, as table 1 shows, it exhibits some limited variation around its median value. Indeed, for all the routes The table includes a selection of routes with more than 1,000 observations in our estimation sample.
in the table, despite the wide sample period covered by the data, the distribution of Top Fare is highly concentrated. In many routes, its maximum value coincides with the median and the mode values, which are only marginally above the mean value, thus suggesting a very limited number of cases where Top Fare assumes values below the mode. On other routes, the maximum value is higher, but by not more than 10 or 20 pounds above the median/mode. Overall, it appears that Top Fare is largely insensitive to the number of seats that remain to be sold, as well as to the number of days that separate the fare retrieval from the flight's departure. This is also supported by the low standard deviations reported. Second, and relatedly, if Seats < 50, in line with the capacity-based theories, Top Fare represents the maximum fare of a flight. When a query that closes the flight is issued, the Ryanair reservation system always retrieves the fare associated with the value of the last seat. The capacity of a Ryanair flight is 189 seats. When Seats = N < 50, issuing a query for N seats always retrieves the value of the 189th seat in the template. Consistently, when S = 50 (i.e., when we do not know the exact number of available seats), Top Fare indicates the fare of the 50th seat ahead of the one that being made available.
It follows that Top Fare varies in a similar fashion as Fare1, and their two values can coincide when only a few seats remain on a flight. Table 2 shows also that with 50 seats or more available, the fares for one seat cannot, a fortiori, refer to the last seats available on a flight, and indeed we do not observe any coincidence between equivalent values of Fare1 and Top Fare between the two tables. Furthermore, the value of one seat when there are at least 50 available is expected to be no higher than the fare for one seat when 49 or fewer remain to be sold. This is clearly borne out by the difference in the mean values of Fare1 when the remaining number of seats is either below the value of 50 or not.
The previous analysis therefore interprets Top Fare as the price of the last seat that can be purchased in a single query. Although Top Fare exhibits limited variation when Seats < 50, when Seats = 50 (i.e., 50 or more seats are available) Top Fare corresponds to the price of the 50th seat ahead, and therefore it varies in a similar fashion as Fare1.
V. Preliminary Evidence
The results drawn from the descriptive analysis in this section help to gain better insight into the airline's pricing policy and its relation to both the in-flight seat availability and 906 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS the purchasing date. They also provide a useful guide for the specification of the econometric model and the interpretation of its findings. Figure 1 shows the median spline plot of Fare1 on Sold Seats, which represents the complement to 50 for the number of available seats retrieved by the spider (i.e., 50 − Seats), and is thus available only for observations where the number of available seats is strictly fewer than 50. The values in the figure refer to the route from London Gatwick to Dublin: each line represents a different flight code. The lowest fare is about 25 pounds, and the highest is just below 150 pounds. In all periods and for all flights, the plot shows, on average, a monotonically increasing relationship; fluctuations are probably due to idiosyncratic changes in the template or to lack of fare observations for specific occupancy values. 12 To generalize the evidence from one route to the entire sample, in figure 2 we follow the approach that Puller et al. (2009) used. We first calculate, for each flight-code/booking day combination, the mean value of both Fare1 and Sold Seats in a given month; then we derive the percentage deviation of each daily observation from each respective mean value. Next, we aggregate the pairs of percentage deviations across two categories of booking days: early-middle and middlelate, that is, 70 to 35 and 28 to 1 days from departure. In the first category, an increase (decrease) of 20% of Sold Seats from its mean, as reported on the horizontal axis, is associated with an increase (decrease) of about 110% (60-70%) in Fare1 from its mean (as can be read on the vertical axis). In the second, fares appear to be more responsive to increases in a flight's occupancy rate. Indeed, the same increase of 20% over the mean of Sold Seats is associated with an almost 200% 12 A smoother increasing relationship can be obtained from a nonparametric plot of the Logarithm of Fare1 with the last fifty seats' occupancy. This is not reported to save on space but is available on request. A number of considerations can be drawn from the graphical analysis. First, the evidence reported in figure 2 suggests that YM techniques designed by airlines to manage capacity constitute an important factor driving price dispersion. Interestingly, despite the methodological similarity, Puller et al. (2009) reach an opposite conclusion in their study of the U.S. airline markets. 13 Second, it introduces the need to combine capacity concerns with at least two other aspects of YM: (a) the fares' temporal profile, that is, the possibility that fares may change regardless of the in-flight remaining capacity, and (b) the discretionary intervention of a yield manager to tackle unexpected contingencies. The latter point will be considered in the econometric analysis, where we employ instrumental variable techniques to isolate the carrier's routine pricing behavior net of such discretionary interventions. Given the crucial role of time in the literature, in the next section we delve deeper into the existence and the characteristics of the temporal profile (Gale & Holmes, 1992 Dana, 1999b; Möller & Watanabe, 2010) .
A. Do Fares Increase as the Flight Fills Up?

B. Do Fares Increase over Time All of the Time?
The descriptive analysis in the section VA highlighted a positive relationship between fares and available seats, which appears to hold on average over a range of dates and routes. In this section, we extend the analysis by focusing on possible time effects in the airline's pricing structure. Our objective is to separate fare changes induced by variations in the flight's remaining capacity from time effects that are unrelated to the actual observed evolution of sales. This is also important in terms of econometric testing, because the time-based theories Fare1 is the fare obtained from a query for one seat. The price drop is calculated conditional on the number of available seats being fewer than fifty, and nonincreasing between two consecutive periods.
lead to predictions that may be confused with those of the capacity-based ones. That is, in both cases, fares may increase over time. In the latter case, fares are based on the shadow cost of capacity, while in the former, airlines increase their fares to exploit consumer heterogeneity. Table 3 reinforces the previous analysis and shows that when we hold the booking day fixed and look at the fares in each line of the table, fares in our sample on average decrease as the availability of seats increases. More interesting, when we condition on capacity utilization to see how fares on average change with the booking day, we observe that the temporal profile of fares assumes a U-shaped form, with the minimum fares occurring 21 to 14 days prior to departure. Indeed, the evidence in every column suggests that during the last fortnight, fares return to the level they assumed about 35 to 28 days before departure. However, it might be possible that the temporal profile in table 3 is due to the aggregation of fares from heterogeneous routes and the extensive sample period used. Therefore, table 4 focuses on economically significant fare changes (worth at least 5 pounds sterling) that occur within a single flight. It illustrates the likelihood of a fare drop over two consecutive booking days, conditional on available seats remaining stable or decreasing. Under such circumstances, we should not observe any drop in fares if the template is decided once and for all, as Dana (1999a) discussed. Conversely, the airline adjusts its fares downward quite frequently, and in ways that appear to be consistent with an active intervention by the yield manager, as suggested by the European Commission (2007), and predicted in Deneckere and Peck (2012) . First, in each row the likelihood of observing a price drop generally increases as more seats become available, especially when the departure time is not within a week. 14 This is consistent with the expectation that drops are likely meant to stimulate demand. The Total row indicates that 13% of observations with at least forty seats available report fare drops, while this occurs in only 6% of observations where fewer than ten seats are recorded. Second, the highest probabilities of observing a drop are found in the 28-to 14-day period, after which they diminish sharply and are hardly observed a few days prior to a flight's departure. Table 4 can identify only cases of decreases, not increases, over time. However, for the large majority of observations, fares increase between two consecutive booking days, and at the same time available capacity reduces. In such a case, using descriptive statistics, it is not easy to separate the variation due to capacity utilization from that due to the time variation. In table 5 we show a pure time variation, since we hold in-flight occupancy fixed between two consecutive booking days by considering only observations where the number of available seats has not changed over two consecutive booking periods. Any change in price is thus not due to a change in the occupancy rate. We distinguish between Large and Moderate changes, the former (latter) being greater (smaller) than 20 pounds sterling in absolute terms. As the first row in the table indicates, the average value of a change tends to be the same for each category of decreases and increases. We also consider the case of no change, which, in line with the capacity-based theories, accounts for the largest majority of observations (about 73%). Interestingly, this also implies that 27% of fare changes are generated by a pure time effect, with increases (N = 1,905) being more than twice as many as decreases (N = 919). The way changes are distributed across flight characteristics does not appear to differ significantly, with some minor exceptions. First, the proportion of increases (decreases) is above (below) the sample mean when the booking day is (is not) within two weeks from departure. That is, it is more likely to observe a fare increase as the date of departure approaches. By the same token, large increases are hardly observed during the early booking period. Second, more pure time variation (i.e., both more increases and decreases) is found in flights that have 14 The fact that 4% to 5% of late booking cases report a price drop when fewer than ten seats are available indicates an active intervention, which may be explained by the carrier's desire to fill a flight to capacity to generate ancillary revenues and boost market shares. This incentive is, however, offset by the need not to offer last-minute discounts, which customers may learn to anticipate-hence, the lower probability of observing a drop within a week from departure. more than twenty seats available and are operated in routes with low competition. 15 Overall, the evidence in tables 3 to 5 suggests that fares are affected by a combination of capacity and time factors. We investigate these in the next section.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
VI. The Econometric Model
Our descriptive analysis thus far provides evidence that both time and capacity are strong drivers of fares. As we discussed in section III, fares are also affected by pricing decisions arising from an unexpected shock. We now aim to trace out an augmented template linking in-flight remaining capacity and time before departure with offered fares, net of human discretionary intervention. This is equivalent to estimating a pricing equation where the independent regressors are Sold Seats and Booking Day dummies, holding other factors fixed. To achieve this, the use of an OLS regression is inappropriate because Sold Seats has two features that need special attention. A first obvious issue is its endogeneity, since some unobserved determinants of the airline pricing behavior may be correlated with a specific flight's time-invariant factors (an issue that could be dealt with using the standard fixed-effects panel technique) and, more important, with the idiosyncratic, discretionary intervention of the airline's yield manager. This aspect calls for an instrumental variables estimator. A second, more subtle, issue, is that Sold Seats is censored due to the retrieving procedure. Indeed, the number of sold seats may range from 0 to 189, the aircraft's capacity. However, we can detect the number of available seats only when they are fewer than fifty. This censoring therefore induces a bias in the estimates and needs to be corrected. Consider a simple model where y is a function of a vector of explanatory variables, x, and z is a vector of instruments, such that:
The key assumption underlying the validity of two stage least squares (2SLS) on the selected sample is E(u | z, s) = 0, where s is a selection indicator. This assumption holds if we observe a random sample selection: s is independent of (z, u), and a sufficient condition for this is that s is independent of (x, y, z). Therefore, it can be proven that the 2SLS estimator on the selected subsample is consistent for β.
However, if the selection indicator is not independent of x, as in our case, things are different. Suppose that x is exogenous and s is a nonrandom function of (x, v) , where v is a variable not appearing in equation (1). If (u, v ) is independent of x, then E(u | x, v) = E(u | v) and we may write:
Specifying a functional form for E(u | v) = γv, we can rewrite:
where e = u − E(u | v). As s is a function of (x, v), E(e | x, v, s) = 0 and β and γ can be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) on the selected sample. Thus, including v in the regression eliminates the sample selection problem and allows us to consistently estimate β. Of course, if some variable in x is endogenous, the procedure to correct for sample selection is the same, while to consistently estimate β, we need 2SLS.
In our specific case, one of the explanatory variables, Sold Seats, is expected to be correlated with the error term u, and therefore instrumental variables are required. Moreover, we need to specify the selection mechanism, which in this case is determined by a censoring of the data. The model in the population is
COMBINED EFFECTS OF CAPACITY AND TIME ON FARES 909 where the logarithmic transformation of Fare1 is meant to linearize its convex relationship with the endogenous regressor Sold Seats shown in figure 2 and table 3, where there is a more than proportional increase in fares as the number of available seats falls; z 1 are the other exogenous regressors, including dummy variables for booking days. 16 Our specification links the current fare with the current in-flight available capacity: this is a significant departure from Escobari (2012) , where lagged values for both are used. Equation (3) is a linear projection for the endogenous and censored variable, and equation (4) describes the censoring induced by the data retrieving procedure:
We allow correlation among the three error terms. We assume (a) (z, Sold Seats * ) is always observed, but (Fare1, Sold Seats) is observed when Sold Seats is not censored, that is, when Sold Seats
and (e) E(z v 2 ) = 0, and zδ 2 = z 1 δ 21 + z 2 δ 22 where (2) can be written as
Since (e, v 3 ) is independent of z by assumption b, we have that E(e | z, v 3 ) = 0. As discussed above, if v 3 were observed, we could estimate equation (5) by 2SLS on the selected sample using as instruments z and v 3 . However, we can obtain v 3 when Sold Seats * > 0, since δ 3 can be consistently estimated by Tobit of Sold Seats * on z, on the entire sample. To sum up, we proceed as follows:
1. We estimate a tobit specification for equation (4) using all observations. 2. We retrieve the residualsv 3 = Sold Seats * − zδ 3 for the selected subsample. 3. On the selected subsample, we estimate a modified version of equation (5), where instead of v 3 , which is not observed, we includev 3 among the regressors. As Sold Seats is endogenous, we adopt an instrumental variable two-stage fixed effect (IVFE) estimator, using as instruments z 1 andv 3 . 17 It is possible to test whether the selection bias is statistically significant by observing the t statistic onv 3 in the IVFE 16 The booking days dummies capture the routine intervention of the yield manager. The true fare-setting model should also include the analyst's discretionary intervention, H, so that LnFare1 = z 1 δ 1 +α Sold Seats+λH +ε. Because H is unobserved and its effect is included in u, endogeneity is thus due to an omitted variable problem resulting from the positive correlation between Sold Seats and H. Indeed, the analyst is more likely to discretionally reduce (increase) fares when Sold Seats is low (high). Therefore, estimation using OLS should produce an upward bias in the coefficient for Sold Seats. 17 Our approach therefore strictly follows procedure 17.4 in Wooldridge (2002) . model: when γ 1 = 0 standard errors should be corrected. We do so by means of a bootstrapping procedure.
A. Model Specification
To estimate equation (5), given the structure of our data, we focus on a panel where the identifier is the single flight (defined by a combination of departure date and flight code) and the time dimension is given by the time before departure (i.e., the booking day). This panel structure allows us to control for all unobserved characteristics that are specific to the single flight, for instance, market structure and distance. Furthermore, focusing on a single flight using a fixed-effects approach allows us to control for possible strategic effects at the route level, where, for example, the airline can opt to implement temporary capacity limits (i.e., reduce the number of daily flights).
With regard to the regressors in equation (5), z 1 includes a set of dummies for both booking days and for month of booking. These exogenous regressors are part of the set of explanatory variables, z in the first-stage estimation. To these we add the residuals from the tobit procedure,v 3 , to account for the sample selection.
To deal with endogeneity, we propose the following identification strategy, which is based on two instruments. Their validity depends on the extent they are correlated with Sold Seats and uncorrelated with the residuals e of the pricing equation. The first is a dummy indicating whether the day the fare was posted is during a holiday period (i.e., main U.K. bank holidays and the week before and after Christmas and Easter). Its effect on Sold Seats may be driven by the fact that the ticket purchasing activity in such periods is likely to be different from nonholiday periods (e.g., when on holiday, a person is less willing to spend time planning future trips), and it is less likely to observe a discretionary intervention by the yield manager (e.g., because there are fewer staff working during holidays).
The second instrument is derived by building on the interpretation of Top Fare and Fare1 presented in section IVB. As the convex relationship between fares and seat occupancy shown in figure 2 suggests, the slope of the template is expected to increase with occupancy and can therefore be considered a valid candidate for an instrument. To derive it, we take the difference between Top Fare and Fare1 and divide it by the number of available seats (50 − Sold Seats). As previously discussed, the difference in the numerator tends to shrink (expand) as occupancy increases (decreases), and so does the denominator. However, the convex relationship indicates that as the plane fills up, the denominator decreases at a faster rate than the numerator, which is sufficient to guarantee a positive correlation between the template's slope and Sold Seats, whose value in the selected subsample is about 0.383. Although the slope captures a relevant feature of the flight's pricing template, it is also correlated with the error e. However, under the assumption that template changes are specific to each daily flight, using the lagged values of the 910 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS slope would still retain the important information about the template, without any correlation with other flights' idiosyncratic shocks. To capture the fact that templates may change with the day of the week (e.g., Monday), the instrument denoted Lag Mean Slope is constructed by averaging, for each booking day, the value of the slope in flights with the same code departing on the same day (e.g., Monday) of the three preceding weeks. Some of these lagged values may belong to observations where Seats = 50, and for which, therefore, we cannot ascertain the exact number of available seats. Nonetheless, this would not affect the interpretation of the instrument as the slope of the template. Indeed, as discussed in section IVB, in this case the instrument would include values of Top Fare indicating not the value of the last seat on the flight but that of the fiftieth seat ahead of the one being available (whose value is captured by Fare1).
Notice that in principle, the same set of exogenous variables, z, could appear in the selection equation and in the first stage of the IV procedure. However, in practice, the two sets of regressors should differ; otherwise, a severe problem of multicollinearity betweenv 3 and z 1 may affect the results (Wooldridge, 2002) . Therefore, in the tobit specification for model (4), we exclude the dummy for the booking during a holiday period and instead include the number of U.K. airports serving the destination airport. This is not correlated with v 3 , since the decision to open a route is generally taken in the preceding quarter, but it captures the fact that a higher demand destination is more likely to be served by more than one U.K. airport. Furthermore, dummies for the day of the week of booking are included in the tobit but not in the IVFE model. Finally, a set of week, route, and daytime of departure dummies is included. These would be dropped in the IVFE procedure used in equation (5).
The validity of the chosen instruments is confirmed by a number of tests presented in tables 7 to 11. The first one is the Hansen's J-statistic for overidentifying restrictions: the joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid. If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis, then all instruments used are considered exogenous. The second one is the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic, which tests whether the equation is identified. A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix of reduced-form coefficients is full column rank and the model is identified. 18 To anticipate our results, both tests, as well as the weak instruments tests not reported, strongly support our choice of instruments. Table 6 reports the tobit and the first-stage estimates. Although in principle, the two sets of regressors should be identical, problems of multicollinearity require the two groups to differ. In addition, the two estimation samples differ, as the tobit model is estimated on all available 18 The tests for weak instruments are reported only in table 6, and refer to the full sample IVFE estimates in table 7. As for the specifications presented in tables 8 to 11, the tests are not reported but are available on request. 
VII. Results
The two samples are built by selecting those flight codes that in a given month had a standard deviation of Sold Seats respectively larger and smaller than the sample one. Bootstrap standard errors (SE) are reported in parentheses, clustered by route and week. There are 250 repetitions. Significant at * 10%, * * 5%, * * * 1%. K-P = Kleibergen-Paap.
observations, while the IVFE model is run on the noncensored subsample. Notwithstanding these two differences, we observe similar results in the two specifications. This suggests that we are correctly accounting for censoring in the dependent variable of the tobit and for its possible bias in the IVFE estimates. As expected, Sold Seats is positively affected by Lag Mean Slope. This is evidence that yield managers raise fares when past sales increase more than expected. This is probably because they anticipate that at least some of the time, changes in the current sales are correlated with future sales or, more directly, because they observe shocks in demand that are correlated with current and future sales. Moreover, the instrument that identifies booking during a holiday period has a negative coefficient: on those days, sales tend to be lower than usual. Table 7 shows the second step of the IVFE estimation. We compare the results with an OLS specification that corrects for selection but not for the endogeneity of Sold Seats. Notice that the IV approach yields a lower coefficient for Sold Seats: a unit increment induces a 3.43% increase in fares if we do not correct for endogeneity, while only a 3.11% increase in the IVFE case. The upward bias of the OLS coefficient for Sold Seats comes from the fact that it includes both the direct impact of Sold Seats due to the airline pricing policy and the indirect impact due to a human discretionary intervention, which is positively related to Sold Seats (see note 16). The magnitude of the Sold Seats coefficient suggests that a considerable proportion of a flight's fare dispersion can be attributed to a capacity effect. Indeed, if we apply a 3.11% change rate per seat to the mean value of Fare1 (65.17 pounds) when Sold Seats changes from its intermediate value (25) to either its maximum (49) or minimum value (1), we obtain a prediction for the fare of about 137.53 pounds and 30.88 pounds, respectively. 19 These results provide strong support to the capacity-based theories and therefore shed empirical light on the relevance of the theoretical setup developed in and 106.65 pounds considering the capacity variation (from 1 to 49 seats), which roughly corresponds to one-third and two-thirds of total variation. Overall, after controlling for endogeneity (i.e., after purging the estimates from the effect due to the discretionary analyst intervention), we obtain strong evidence for both capacity-and time-based theories in driving the airline's pricing policy. In table 8 we check whether these two effects operate cumulatively by interacting Sold Seats with a dummy variable capturing all the booking days within 7, 10, and 14 days, respectively. The insignificant coefficient for the interaction term suggests that the two effects operate independently of one another.
The results in tables 7 and 8 are obtained using data from a heterogeneous sample featuring 82 routes that differ in terms of market structure and length. In turn, each route includes flights that vary by departure time, day of the week, and seasonal period, for example. Indeed, the summary statistics reported in tables 1 and 2 indicate that the pricing policy of the airline could vary across routes (e.g., substantial differences in terms of mean and maximum value of Fare1 and Top Fare); furthermore, tables 4 and 5 suggest additional complexity in the pricing behavior that is compatible with variability at the flight level. In the remainder of the paper, we study whether the average pricing policy depicted in table 7 changes as we take these sources of heterogeneity into account.
A. Demand Volatility and Flight Characteristics
First, we study whether differences in the pricing profile arise in relation to the extent of aggregate demand uncertainty: a pricing policy based on available capacity may be less precisely applied when flights exhibit large rather than small demand volatility, thus leading to a larger role for the time dimension. In table 9 high-(low-) volatility flights are those whose standard deviation of Sold Seats in a given month is larger (smaller) than the sample one. As expected, the impact of Sold Seats is weaker than average in the highvolatility sample, where, in addition, the temporal profile is steeper.
Second, table 10 offers further insights into the nature of the effects of in-flight remaining capacity and booking days on fares. First, we use the samples of morning and evening flights, since the departure time is likely to vary with the passengers' travel motivation and their flight's convenience. 20 The coefficient of Sold Seats is found to be larger in the 20 Morning flights are from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.; evening ones from 4:00 p.m. to 10.15 p.m. We thus exclude late morning and afternoon flights. evening sample. As evidence not reported here indicates, evening flights include a larger proportion of observations with a higher number of sold seats, and, hence, such a larger demand is met with a pricing policy designed to manage a higher shadow cost of capacity.
Third, the last two columns of table 10 consider the two samples of flights operated in the winter (November-March) and the summer (April-October) periods. Because Ryanair serves many Mediterranean destinations whose demand is obviously larger in the summer, the higher coefficient for Sold Seats is again due to the adoption of a pricing policy that weighs capacity issues more heavily. Interestingly, the U-shaped temporal profile is found only in the summer flights, possibly because larger demand is also accompanied by larger customers' heterogeneity. In such a situation, the airline faces a stronger incentive to adopt a U-shaped temporal profile to attract price-sensitive consumers with high demand uncertainty who would not book their flights too far in advance.
In situations of higher demand, evening and summer routes, the capacity effect dominates. If we consider the price variation due to time and capacity independently, as discussed in table 7, we find that the latter accounts for approximately three-quarters of the total. In lower-demand conditions, the price variations induced by capacity and time are more similar. 21 However, the sum of the two effects is of a comparable magnitude across the different subsamples.
Finally, in table 11 we investigate whether the different cost structure that characterizes routes of varying length may affect the carrier's pricing approach. Indeed, short-haul flights are subject to higher operative costs per kilometer due to the greater fuel consumption during take-off and landing. This is likely to induce a pricing strategy that is based more on the capacity dimension. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the coefficient of Sold Seats is larger in the shorthaul sample. Furthermore, the prominent U-shaped temporal profile indicates a stronger reliance on a time-based strategy aiming at attracting passengers with a lower willingness to pay, who in other circumstances would not be targeted.
Overall, while the analysis in this section confirms the important role played by both the capacity and the time dimensions, it also highlights how the airline may vary its pricing policy mix depending on some of the underlying characteristics at the flight or route level. Dana (1999a) characterizes an equilibrium in price distributions where higher prices are associated with higher occupancy rates. An important prediction of Dana's model is that the price distribution's domain expands as competition 21 More precisely, in the evening (summer) sample we have a price variation induced by time of 41.66 pounds (43.77 pounds) and 126.00 pounds (115.81 pounds) for capacity variation. For morning (winter) flights, the time variation is 68.49 pounds (94.89 pounds), and the capacity variation is 94.98 pounds (85.82 pounds).
B. Market Structure
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increases. Unlike a monopolist, competitive firms pass through all of their cost increases, and therefore they should exhibit more intrafirm price dispersion. However, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) argue that in less competitive markets, it may be easier to implement price discrimination tactics. Their estimates support the hypothesis that overall price dispersion should decrease with competition. By focusing on particular forms of online price discrimination strategies by European LCAs, Bachis and Piga (2011) also show that such strategies are more likely to be found in less competitive markets.
To study how the coefficient of Sold Seats changes with market structure, we have distinguished between markets with low and high competition, where a market is identified at both the route and the city-pair level. 22 In less competitive markets, Ryanair is at most a duopolist at either the route or the city-pair level, while in highly competitive ones, travelers may substitute Ryanair's services with those of at least two or more of its direct competitors on that route/city-pair. 23 Table 11 reports the estimates from the low-and the highcompetition subsamples and shows that the coefficient of Sold Seats is larger in markets with low competition. Thus, when travelers find it more difficult to substitute Ryanair's services with those of competitors, Ryanair appears to adopt a pricing policy where a larger proportion of seats are assigned higher fares and therefore the gradient of Sold Seats is on average steeper than those in more competitive markets. Our findings thus suggest that competitive pressure flattens the relationship between fares and the remaining capacity, in contrast with the prediction in Dana (1999a) , where fare dispersion increases with competition. However, as far as the temporal profile is concerned, the estimates confirm the previous finding of a significant time effect. Furthermore, flights exhibiting significant price drops six to two weeks before departure feature exclusively in the subsample of highly competitive markets.
VIII. Conclusion
This study has built on the extensive and well-developed theoretical literature on airline pricing and sheds new empirical light on two of its predictions. It thus fills a gap in the literature, since very few studies have managed to overcome the scarcity of appropriate data. To do so, we rely on data obtained from the website of Ryanair, whose business model closely aligns with the assumptions used in the theoretical literature.
Both the descriptive and the econometric evidence lend strong support to the hypothesis of fares becoming higher as fewer seats remain available on a flight. On average, each extra sold seat induces a 3.11% increase in a flight's fare. Such a result indicates that the capacity dimension is an important 22 A city-pair defines the airline market for two cities (e.g., London and Milan). It generally includes more than one route, each identified by a unique airport-pair combination (e.g., London Heathrow/Milan Malpensa and London Stansted/Milan Linate).
23 Data on market structure are from the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority.
determinant of airline pricing. The study also reveals novel evidence regarding the temporal profile of fares. All econometric specifications show a sharp increase in fares in the last few days prior to departure, which is consistent with the idea that late bookers are less willing to substitute a flight with another departing on a different time or date. This leads to the conclusion that Ryanair's pricing policy appears to be designed to include late increases in fares regardless of the actual observed capacity utilization. That is, higher late fares are part of an ex ante YM decision by the airline. More important, the descriptive evidence points to a more complex, U-shaped temporal profile, where early bookers (those booking at least 49 days prior to departure) appear to pay a higher fare than those booking between 35 and 14 days from departure. Indeed, the evidence captures a similar effect that is quite robust to variations in the sample composition. Overall, the evidence indicates that a monotonic temporal profile is not necessarily observed after capacity utilization is controlled for.
Furthermore, in addition to providing a test for two strands of literature on airline pricing, this paper provides the foundation for an investigation of the theoretical prediction, reported in Dana (1999a) , that fare dispersion is expected to be larger in competitive markets. Although this issue has been widely studied, the prediction has received mixed support when dispersion is measured at the route level (Borenstein & Rose, 1994; Gerardi & Shapiro, 2009) . The flight-level analysis in this study supports the findings in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) that the lack of competitive pressure allows Ryanair to extract more surplus from consumers with more inelastic demand. This is revealed in our estimates by a steeper template in less competitive markets, implying that the last seats are sold at higher fares.
Finally, it is worth recalling that our results relate to the pricing behavior of the largest European low-cost carrier, Ryanair. It is left to future research to investigate the extent to which the YM approach we have illustrated is relevant for other airlines (with a similar or different business model) in different geographical areas.
